Exodus 21:16

And he who stealeth a soul of the children of Israel, and selleth him, or if he be found in his possession, shall die by strangling.

AND HE THAT STEALETH A MAN, AND SELLETH HIM, AND HE BE FOUND IN HIS HAND — “previously, before the sale.” This is Rashi’s language. But I have not understood it., it would appear that the fact that the witnesses saw him in his possession constitutes their proof that the holder stole him. On this, Ramban asked: could you possibly think that the thief be subject to death without the witnesses having seen the actual theft and the sale? Their having seen him in the thief’s possession is in fact no proof at all that he had stolen him (Nimukei Shmuel). If Rashi means that witnesses must have seen him [the stolen person] in the thief’s possession before he had sold him — could it even enter your mind that the thief be subject to the death penalty without witnesses having seen him stealing and also seeing him selling! It would therefore have been sufficient if Scripture were to say: “and he that stealeth a man and selleth him”. Further, his being found in the thief’s possession is no real proof that he stole him! Rather, this verse is the source for that which we have been taught in a Mishnah: “He that steals a person is not liable to the punishment unless he brings him into his own possession,” and in a Beraitha the Rabbis have said: “If he stole him but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he is still in his [the thief’s], possession, he is free [from the death penalty].” The meaning of this is to teach us that the law applying to the thief of a human being is [in one respect] similar to that of thieves of other, i.e., monetary, matters; namely, that if a thief killed or sold [an ox or a sheep] within the domain of the owner, he is free [from paying five oxen for an ox and four sheeps for a sheep], but if he lifted them up [thereby acquiring possession of them], or removed them from the domain of the owner, he is liable to pay. Similarly, this thief of a human being must first have brought the stolen person into his own domain [in order to be liable to death]. Likewise if he lifted the lad upon his shoulder, and sold him to another person, he is liable to the death penalty, because this too is called if he be found in his hand, since it is not logical that a man’s ground should have a greater power of taking possession of a thing for the owner, than his own hand has. In a similar way, that which the Rabbis said [in the Beraitha mentioned above]: “or if he sold him but he is still in his [the thief’s] possession etc.,” means that the buyer did not …

וגונב איש, but if someone kidnaps a person, etc.” the reason why this scenario is written between the verses where striking a father a or cursing him is written, is because the penalty for striking a father or kidnapping a person is death by strangulation, while the penalty for cursing one’s father is by stoning (more severe). In Leviticus 20,9, the penalty for cursing is described both as מות יומת, “he is sure to be executed,” plus the additional words: דמיו בו, “his blood(guilt) is upon him.” Although we might have thought that cursing one’s parent should carry a lighter sentence than physically assaulting him, seeing it does not involve an act, whereas striking includes an act of violence, the Torah decreed a more severe penalty for the cursing of one’s parent, i.e. death by stoning. According to the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin, folio 49, the reason why a severe type of death penalty is applied for cursing one’s parents, is that the Torah compares the parents as deserving a similar degree of honour as that shown to G–d, seeing that the parents brought you into this world. Cursing G–d is punishable by stoning as we know from the blasphemer in Leviticus 24,14. Seeing that it impossible to strike G–d, any comparison with striking a parent is inappropriate. Hence the death penalty for that sin is chenek, strangulation. Furthermore, when someone was guilty of cursing his parents after they had died he is still guilty of the same sin, whereas if the same person had struck his father after he had died the death penalty does not apply, as it was part of the penalties listed for causing injury (Compare Mechilta Mishpatim, section 5.). It is impossible to inflict an injury upon someone who is already dead. Our author asks that if one cannot inflict injury after death and therefore the death penalty by stoning is not applied, why is the same not true of someone who cursed G–d, seeing it is impossible to harm Him in any way? Perhaps the fact that the subject of cursing G–d, and the penalty for this appears next to the subject of the blasphemer in Leviticus chapter 24, makes my question irrelevant.